Abstract
Introduction
As research and development activities in agent-based systems progress, we can expect to see that in the future much of our computer-related works are done with the help of agents. Much efforts in the design of these agents are directed toward making them "intelligent". The term here is loosely translated as enabling the agents to actively seek the best way to fulfill their tasks, by taking into accounts the dynamics of their environments. Learning agents fit into this description best, as they are characterized as having the ability to adapt their interaction strategies based on the perceptions of their environment.
In some systems, an agent may be working in the presence of other agents, either automated or human. These types of systems are called multi-agent systems (MAS), and are currently an active area of research. One important motivation behind the research is to find techniques that allow multiple agents to coordinate their actions so that individual rational actions do not adversely affect the overall system efficiency [1] . Effective coordination among agents in dynamic environments may be achieved by extending the agents' learning ability to recognize the capabilities, desires, and beliefs of other agents present in their environment [6] .
Several papers have reported variety of techniques for constructing the models of agents. [10] described a rulebased model for plan recognition task in the air combat simulation environment, while [2] explored the use of finite automata to model the opponent agent's strategy. A series of papers reported works on recursive modeling method (RMM) for decision-theoretic agents, which uses deeper, nested models of other agents [7, 15, 5, 4, 12] . RMM represents an agent's decision situation in the form of a payoff matrix. In terms of belief, desire and intention (BDI) architecture, a payoff matrix contains a compiled representation of the agent's capabilities, preferences, and beliefs about the world. Beliefs about other agents are represented in terms of their own payoff matrices. These matrices form a hierarchical modeling structure, which is evaluated in the bottomup fashion to determine the agent's action that maximize its expected utility.
Another decision-theoretic tool for constructing models of agents is an influence diagram (or decision network), which represents information about an agent's capabilities, preferences, and beliefs in a more explicit form. While RMM payoff matrices can be seen to summarize the information contained in the influence diagram [12] , this type of representation may provide better insight to the learning problem as it completely specifies all known random variables in the domain and their dependence relationships.
In our work, we seek to develop a method that can be used by an agent to learn the models of other agents. Our basic paradigm is to use decision-theoretic notion of rationality to describe and predict actions of other agents. Thus, we use influence diagrams as a modeling representation for agents. Given an initial model of an agent and a history of its observed behavior, we construct new models by refining the parameters of influence diagram in the initial model. We use BDI architecture as a framework, and we perform learning in stages, starting with the agent's capabilities, then modifying its preferences, and finally, its beliefs. These stages are ordered in the increasing level of complexity. Since the correct model is not known with certainty, we may have to maintain a number of new models. The probabilities of a model being correct can be assigned based on how well it predicts the history of behavior.
The rest of the paper starts with an overview of influence diagrams, followed by examples on how they can be used to represent decision models of agents. In the next section, we get into the problem on learning the models of other agents. We present a learning method for other agents capabilities and preferences, and we provide an example on how to apply it in a particular MAS domain. Finally, we present our conclusions and directions for further work.
Influence Diagrams
An Influence diagram [9] is a graphical knowledge representation of a decision problem. It may be viewed as an extension to a Bayesian or belief network [13] , with additional node types for decisions and utilities. Influence diagrams have three types of nodes: nature node, decision node, and utility node. Just as in belief networks, nature nodes are associated with random variables or features, which represent the agent's possibly uncertain beliefs about the world. Decision node holds the choice of actions an agent has, thus represents the agent's capabilities. Utility node represent the agent's preferences. The links between the nodes summarize their dependence relationships.
In utility theory, agent's preferences are represented as real valued number, namely utility, which expresses the desirability of a world state. The mapping from a state to a utility value is called a utility function. In an influence diagram, the value of utility function is represented in the diamond-shaped utility node, and the features that are the arguments to this function are assigned to be the parents of the utility node. Commonly, the table associated with utility node is a straight tabulation of the agent's utility as a function of the parents.
Evaluation of the influence diagram is done by setting the value of the decision node to a particular choice of action, and treating the node just as a nature node with a known value that can further influence the values of other nodes. We calculate the action's utility, first by calculating the conditional probabilities for the parents of the utility node using standard inference algorithm, and then feeding the results to the utility function. The algorithm for evaluating influence diagrams are given in [14] . In the next subsections, we give some examples on how to use influence diagrams to represent agents' decision models in MAS domains.
Anti-air Defense Domain
Here we present an anti-air defense domain adapted from [12] . The scenario shown in Figure 1 two agents, in the roles of the defending units, against two incoming missiles in a 20x20 grid world. Each defending unit has only one interceptor and has to decide, in the absence of communication, which of the incoming missiles to intercept. When a missile reaches the ground, it detonates and inflicts damage in proportion to its warhead size. The goal of each unit is to minimize damage to the overall ground site. To coordinate their interception decisions the units have to model each other to avoid redundant targeting of the same threat.
In Figure 2 , we show a representation that unit B1 may have to model decision-making of unit B2. The nature nodes represent all the world features that influence the unit's decision. The missile's speed and warhead size, the angle and distance between the missile and the unit, and the type of interceptor the unit has (long range or short range) are the relevant features. The model measures missile's interceptability, or the likelihood of intercepting a missile, given the type of the interceptor and given the speed, angle, and distance to the missile. The expected damage resulting from the attack is proportional to the missile's interceptability and warhead size. B2's preference is indicated by the link from Damage to utility node U. The utility function is thus a function of damage. In RMM, information or knowledge that an agent has about other agents can be represented as other models nested within the agent's own model. The same principle can be applied to our influence diagram representation. Consider B1's Action node in Figure 2 . If B2 has information about B1's decision process, we can construct a representation of B1's decision model according to B2's beliefs. We shall call it B2's model of B1. Since B2 may not know for certain the correct model of B1, it may maintain several models, each is assigned the probability of being correct. The conditional probabilities of B1's Action can be determined by probabilistically combining evaluation results of all models of B1.
Pursuit Domain
The pursuit domain represents a classic coordination task, in which four agents in the roles of predators are attempting to surround a prey in a two-dimensional square grid, as shown Figure 3 . The agents move simultaneously at discrete time steps, and cannot occupy the same grid. The game ends when: 1) all predators have surrounded the prey on four sides, 2) the prey is pushed against a wall so that it cannot make any moves, or 3) time runs out. The prey's actions are governed by a simple rule, which is to move away from the predators' center of gravity.
It is clear that if the agents want to capture the prey, they need to coordinate their actions with each other. Figure 4 shows Predator 1's decision model, which takes into account the movement of other agents to arrive at the best next move. In this model, the agent's utility are influenced by the distance of all predators to the prey, and how many quadrants or sides the predator have surrounded the prey. 
Learning Problem
As we have mentioned, the purpose of learning models of other agents is to have models that can predict other agents' behavior correctly, so that the predictions will lead the learning agent to arrive at the best decision in term of meeting the goal efficiently. The agent should already have a multi-agent reasoning system and maintain models of other agents in its knowledge base. Due to uncertainty, the agent assigns probabilities to the models, which are updated based on a history of the other agents' observed behavior. If a model is not accurate, its probability will gradually decrease. This signals the need for a better model, which can be obtained by learning.
In most situations, information about other agents only come from our observation of their behavior. Let us define a history of an agent's behavior as a set of its observed actions during a particular time frame, in which the data of the world states are known. Given only a history of behavior, how do we learn a better model? Our idea is modify the initial model by refining parameters in influence diagram that are associated with capabilities, preferences and beliefs of other agent, based on the history of its behavior. The refinement can be done in stages with the order as above, according to the increasing level of complexity. The learning process is similar to a hill climbing search in a space of possible models. There can be a number of modified models that can be generated. We will allow the modified models to compete with each other and other models maintained by the learning agent. The probability of each model being correct can be arrived based on how well the model predicts the history of behavior.
As we mentioned, we model the other agents as influence diagrams. From the point of view of learning, influence diagrams inherit the main feature of learning in belief networks that boils down to finding the correct network structure and the local probability distributions, given the data about the world. Additional aspects of learning in influence diagrams relate to the character of decision and utility nodes. As a modeling representation tool, influence diagram is able to express an agent's capabilities, preferences, and beliefs, which are required if we want to predict the agent's behavior. Whereas learning problem in belief network is limited to learning the beliefs, influence diagram allows us to extend the description with learning the capabilities, that is, finding the correct possible value assignments for the decision node, and learning the preferences, which is finding the correct utility function.
The rest of this section describe the method we use to perform the refinement in an influence diagram. We discuss the strategy for learning the capabilities and the beliefs, but we concentrate on a method for learning the preferences.
Capabilities
An agent's capabilities are the alternative courses of actions it can execute to interact with the world. In an influence diagram, we represent them as possible value assignments to the agent's decision node. These values need to be exhaustive, which means that a model of other agent should cover all the possibilities of what the agent can do, even if they are not known or very unlikely. To avoid the obvious difficulty in listing all the possibilities, knowledge engineer can specify Other action value to represent all the unknown or unlikely actions not explicitly represented. At times, the agent may observed to be executing an action that is not explicitly present in our current model. In this case, we modify the model by specifying the action as explicit possible value of the decision node, and by updating the CPT's of the nodes that are influenced by the decision node.
For example, consider the agent as a defense unit B1 in the anti-air defense domain. It may be that initially B1 thinks that B2 is not equipped with long range interceptors. It would then model the capabilities of B2 as a set of decision node's values fSR M1; SR M2; Otherg in B1's model of B2, where SR M1 and SR M2 denote the actions of launching short range interceptors at missile M1 and M2, respectively. At some time, B1 could observe that B2 launches long range interceptor at one of the targets. Given this observation, B1 will modify its model of B2; the refined set of decision node's values is fSR M1; SR M2; LR M1; LR M2; Othersg, where LR M1 and LR M2 explicitly represent the actions of launching long range interceptors at M1 and M2, which were thought unlikely before.
Conversely, sometimes the other agent's capabilities may need to be collapsed and included as part of the Other value. This may happen, for example, when B2 has become incapacitated and can no longer perform certain actions. From B1's perspective, it may notice that certain actions are missing from B2's history of behavior, especially when B1 believes that the missing action is the action B2 should take, if it is capable of it. To guarantee that the situation is caused only by an inaccuracy in modeling B2's capabilities, we need to identify the next preferable action given the model. If it agrees with the history of behavior, we can reason that the model still captures B2's beliefs and preferences except that somehow B2 cannot do the action that is missing from the history of behavior. B1's model of B2 is modified by removing the value of the missing action from the decision node.
Preferences
When a model of other agent cannot explain the history of its behavior, one of the possible reasons is that the agent's preferences are not accurately represented by the model. Our strategy will be to modify the model by refining the utility function so that every action in the history of behavior always maximizes utilities of the resulting states. Let U(S) denote the utility of state S, which is given by a utility function.
The general structure of utility function is:
U(S) = f(X 1 ; :::; X N )
where X = fX 1 ; :::; X N g is a set of features that directly influence the agent's preferences. In influence diagram, X is the set of parents of the utility node. The utility function f, is commonly postulated in multi-attribute utility theory [11, 14] to be a weighted sum of the factors of values of features X k , k = 1; :::; N. For simplicity, we assume that weighted factors depend linearly on the features X k . This is a strong approximation, for example, in case of the utility of money, St. Petersburg paradox shows that it is not linear. We use this assumption here to simplify the learning procedure.
Therefore, we rewrite an agent's utility function as follows:
U(S) = w 1 x 1 + ::: + w N x N (2) where each weight w k corresponds to a feature X k and represents the feature's measure of influence on the agent's utility, and x k is the value of the feature X k in state S. Our method of learning the agent's preferences will modify the weights w k .
Let A denote an action that maximizes expected utility:
where A = fa 1 ; :::; a M g is a set of the agent's alternative actions, and S j are the possible outcome states given a, possibly non-deterministic, action a i , with j ranging over J different outcomes. The background evidence E in the conditional probabilities represents the known data of the world which are provided in the history of behavior. Using Equation 2 and 3, we obtain: x k;l P(X k = x k;l ja i ; E) (6) From the history of other agent's behavior, we have a set of the agent's observed actions during a given time frame.
Let D = fD(1); :::; D(T)g denotes such set, where T is the total number of actions, and D(t) 2 A, t = 1; :::; T. The refinement of utility function is accomplished by having an initial utility function derived from the initial model, and subsequently adjusting the weights w k based on the set D, so that D(t) is equal to A for every situation t.
The choice of initial utility function depends on the initial knowledge the learning agent has about the other agent. For example, if agent B1 knows that B2's preferences are only influenced by the features Damage and Cost, although it doesn't know exactly how B2 computes them, B1 can model B2's utility function only with the two features, and learn the correct weights. But in the extreme case where B1 has absolutely no knowledge on B2's preferences, it may have to put all the known features in B2's utility function and assign zero to all the weights.
To adjust the weights we follow a procedure common in neural network learning. In the context of neural network, our learning is best described as a supervised learning for performing the task of function approximation. We can render Equation 5 into neural network structure as shown in Figure 5 y i (t) = 1 v i (t) > v j (t) for all j 6 = i 0 otherwise (7) where i = 1; :::; M. Let d i (t) represents the desired output value from D(t) as follows:
Weight adjustment is done by applying a well-known gradient descent technique, namely delta rule [16] . The idea is to minimize a cost function based on the error signal e i (t) so that each weight adjustment brings the actual output value closer to the desired value. A commonly used cost function is the mean-square-error criterion:
where e i (t) is the error signal which is defined by:
According to delta rule, the weight adjustment is proportional to the product of the error signal and the input unit.
In our network, we use weight sharing to indicate the symmetry of the utility computation. We settle the adjustment for a shared weight as the sum of the correction of weights for all output units. We require normalization on before presenting it to the network, so that the resulting weights are normalized. The normalization is given by:
Thus, the final rule is given by:
where k = 1; :::; N and is a positive constant that determines the rate of learning. The probabilities required to compute i can be determined by evaluating the influence diagram model of the agent for every a i .
Example
For demonstration of our method, let us consider a simple situation in the anti-air defense domain. Say that B1 knows there are at most two features that influence preferences of the unit B2. That is, the set of features that can influence B2's utility is fDamage; Costg, where the possible value assignments for Damage are (0; 100; 500) and Cost (0; 1000; 5000).
B1 initially models B2's utility in inverse proportion to
Damage and independent to Cost. Therefore, the initial assignment of weights to features is: The above values reflect that using the advanced interceptor for missile M1 is more likely to reduce damage, but also more likely to incure a higher cost. The values of expected damage and cost are computed using Equation 6: As the result of considering this unexpected behavior of B2, therefore, B1 adjusted the weights it uses to model B2's utility function. Intuitively, the adjusted weights indicate that B2 does not care about the damages as much as B1 initially thought, and that it cares abut the costs of the defense operation as well.
In our experiments we simulated 100 decision situations, in which the positions and the sizes of the attacking missiles were generated randomly for each situation, and B2's behavior was guided by it's preference to minimize both damages and costs in equal proportion. After these iterations, the weights were further to the values: This result confirms our intuition in this case; as B1 observed B2's behavior, its model of B2's utility function started resembling B2's actual preferences. The final weights are not identical to those used by B2, however. This is due to the small learning rate used in our experiments which made for a slow update in the 100 cases we ran.
Beliefs
An agent's beliefs are represented in influence diagram as the nature nodes and the probabilistic dependence relationships that exist among them. Given that we have knowledge on other agent's capabilities and preferences, and that our model of it still cannot predict its behavior, it is reasonable to assume that the model may not have the correct dependence links or probability assignments. We modify the model by refining the links and the probability assignments. The obvious difficulty is to determine where to begin the refinement. In a complex model, there can be a large number of possibilities that can account for the problem. What we need is to have a learning method that, given a history of the agent's behavior, can trace down the elements in the belief system which need refinement.
Although there are some good algorithms for learning the structure and local probability distributions, such as K2 algorithm [3] , we see a difficulty in applying such algorithms to our problem. For example, K2 requires a database of cases on features for constructing the network. Translated to our problem, it means that a learning agent has to have a database of cases on features according to the other agent in order to construct the probabilistic model of it. Given that all the learning agent has is maybe only the history of other agent's behavior, we won't be able to apply the algorithm .
Our preliminary idea for approaching the problem is to apply similar learning method that we have reported in the previous subsection, only now we set the weights fixed and learn the expected values of the features which influence the utility. By using this process, it is possible to determine which of the feature nodes that are likely to be the source of inaccuracy in the model. We let denote the set of of such feature nodes. There are several strategies we can take to modify the model. The strategies are based on exploring the possible reasons that cause the model's failure to predict the behavior.
The first strategy assumes that the reason is due to incorrect local probability distributions of the features in . Based on this assumption, the model is modified by refining CPT's on the feature nodes in .
The second strategy assumes that the reason is due to incorrect dependence relationships involving the features in . The model is modified by refining the structure of influence diagram. The alternatives are to remove links from certain parent nodes, or to add more links from other nodes.
The third strategy assumes that the problem is caused, not by the features in , but by their parents. It is possible that certain parent nodes have incorrect probability distributions or incorrect dependence relationships. The model is modified by performing these strategies at the level of the parent nodes of . Note that this strategy has a recursive property. It allows the refinement goes bottom up until there are no more parents or the evidence nodes are reached.
For example, consider the situation where B1 observes B2 intercepts missile M1. B1 knows for certain that B2's preference is to minimize damage to the ground. Given that B1 knows that damage would have been minimized had B2 intercepted M2, B1 reasons that it doesn't correctly model B2's beliefs on the values of the node Damage. In this case, we assign = fDamageg. Let B1's model of B2 be similar to the one in Figure 2 . According to the model, damage is measured by the missile's size and interceptability, shown by the links from Size and Interceptability to Damage.
The first strategy reflects a possible reason that B2 really considers intercepting M1 as minimizing damage. This would mean that B1's model of B2 doesn't correctly represent the way B2 evaluates damage. The model is modified by refining local probability distribution in the node
Damage.
The second strategy reflects another possible reason that B1 incorrectly models B2's beliefs about the dependence relationships from size and interceptability to damage. For example, maybe B2 only considers size as a single factor which influence damage, or maybe B2 considers other factors that affect damage, besides size and interceptability. The model can be modified by removing some links to Damage, or adding new links from other nodes to Damage.
The third strategy reflects a reason that B1 incorrectly models B2's beliefs about the dependence relationships at the level of the nodes that influence Damage. For example, maybe B2's beliefs about the size of incoming missiles are not represented in B1's model of B2. The model can be modified in several ways according to the strategies we described, but now they are done at the level of the nodes Size and Interceptability.
These strategies attempt to narrow down the search space of possible models. However, the number of models we come up with can still be unreasonably high, and we are yet to develop a method that can decrease the number further.
Conclusion and Further Work
In this paper, we developed a framework that can be used by an agent to learn models of other agents in a multi-agent system. The framework makes use of influence diagrams as a modeling representation tool. We addressed three strategies to create a new model of the other agent, which are based on learning its capabilities, preferences, and beliefs, given an initial model and the agent's behavior data.
We presented a method for learning the agents' capabilities, and our preliminary ideas on how to learn the beliefs, but we concentrated and gave examples on learning of the other agent's preferences. Our method attempts to modify the other agent's utility function by incorporating a neural network learning technique, which involves the presentation of the history of other agent's observed behavior as the training set and a series of weight adjustments. The new model for the agent is created by replacing the initial model's utility function with the one produced by our method. To assign the probability to the new model being correct, we allow it to compete with other models we have by presenting the history of behavior and performing probabilistic update based on how well each model predicts the behavior.
In our future work we will implement the learning algorithm for modifying another agent's beliefs, and we will integrate all of the learning algorithms with the agent's probabilistic frame-based knowledge base.
